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THE EFFECTS OF A MANDATORY BODY-WORN CAMERA POLICY
ON OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY,
OVERSIGHT, AND DEPARTMENTAL CULTURE
JORDAN M. HYATT,* RENÉE J.MITCHELL,** & BARAK ARIEL***
INTRODUCTION

T

HE discourse surrounding the role of body-worn cameras (BWCs) in
policing has become increasingly visible in a relatively short period of
time. Advances in digital recording, cameras, big-data technologies, and
machine learning algorithms have collectively allowed for the development of BWCs that can be integrated into law enforcement activities and
by implication digitize a system that is otherwise analog. The role of video
and audio recording of crime has been fairly well-examined for some time
and across several domains. These include considerations of the role of
closed-circuit television,1 the recording of police interrogations,2 and traffic violations.3 Citizens themselves are increasingly recording interactions
with law enforcement—which has left the police as one of the parties to
systematically and actively record its interactions with the public.4 Taken
together, and regardless of the source of the video, the existence of these
records has the potential to profoundly influence the intrapersonal dynamics of police-citizen encounters.5 While some law enforcement ac* Drexel University.
** Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
*** Cambridge University & Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
1. See generally Clive Norris et al., The Growth of CCTV: A Global Perspective on the
International Diffusion of Video Surveillance in Publicly Accessible Space, 2 SURVEILLANCE
& SOC. 110 (2002); Brandon C. Welsh & David P. Farrington, Public Area CCTV and
Crime Prevention: An Updated Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 26 JUST. Q. 716
(2009).
2. See generally Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the
Reliability and Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 619 (2003); Eric S. Jefferis et al., The Effect of a Videotaped Arrest on Public Perceptions of Police Use of Force, 25
J. CRIM. JUST. 382 (1997); Mike McConville, Videotaping Interrogations: Police Behaviour on and off Camera, CRIM. L. REV., 1992 at 532; Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic
Recording of Custodial Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1127 (2005).
3. See generally Alena Erke, Red Light for Red-Light Cameras?: A Meta-Analysis of
the Effects of Red-Light Cameras on Crashes, 41 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 897
(2009); Paul Pilkington & Sanjay Kinra, Effectiveness of Speed Cameras in Preventing
Road Traffic Collisions and Related Casualties: Systematic Review, 330 BMJ 331 (2005).
4. See generally Dina Mishra, Comment, Undermining Excessive Privacy for Police:
Citizen Tape Recording to Check Police Officers’ Power, 117 YALE L.J. 1549 (2008);
Michael Potere, Comment, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording Police
Conduct, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 273 (2012).
5. See Nikki Jones & Geoffrey Raymond, “The Camera Rolls”: Using Third-Party
Video in Field Research, 642 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 111 (2012).
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tions have traditionally been recorded on public and private surveillance
cameras, BWCs represent a turning point in the amount of time officers
are recorded, including in the legal obligation in creating these videos.
Although BWCs and car-mounted recording devices have been
around for at least two decades, research on this topic has only begun to
emerge. The first large-scale study on the impact of BWCs was published
in 2015.6 In that study, Barak Ariel and colleagues conducted a randomized controlled field trial in Rialto, California, and found that on shifts
when officers were assigned to wear a BWC unit, the rate of use of force
incidents by officers and the number of citizen complaints was significantly reduced.7 By providing causal evidence on key outcomes related to
the police/citizen-interactions of BWCs, the study contributed to the expansion of BWC policies across the nation and the world. Many tests of
the efficacy of BWCs soon followed, as we briefly review here.
Notably, the rise of BWCs in American policing did not happen independent of other reforms in policing. Driven by a shift in public scrutiny
and media attention, policing practices rose to the front of the public debate in about 2010. In the United States, the discourse surrounding policing underscored by a belief—however factually erroneous—that the rate
of police killing was both increasing and at the peak levels observed in the
modern era.8 This public outcry rose to new heights shortly after George
Zimmerman was acquitted of fatally shooting Trayvon Martin.9 The
heightened awareness of police practices and challenges to their acceptability in light of perceived—and actual—racial disparities intersected with
the BWCs after several additional, high-profile police-involved shootings
took place. The discourse surrounding law enforcement was further
strained after the shooting of Mr. Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri,
an incident which was not recorded and where the facts and conduct of
both the actors remained in dispute.10 BWCs have the potential to influ6. See generally Barak Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of
Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 31 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509 (2015).
7. See id. at 518.
8. See, e.g., Kevin Johnson, Police Killings Highest in Two Decades, USA TODAY
(Nov. 11, 2014, 04:17 PM), http://usat.ly/1ujU6de [https://perma.cc/ZV9VX4U6].
9. See Channing Joseph & Ravi Somaiya, Demonstrations Across the Country Commemorate Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/07/21/us/demonstrations-across-the-country-commemorate-trayvon-martin
.html?mcubz=1 [https://perma.cc/78Q5-ZBUG]; Matt Williams, Trayvon Martin
Protests Being Held in More Than 100 US Cities, GUARDIAN (July 20, 2013 10:35 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/20/trayvon-martin-protests-us-cities [https://perma.cc/CUE3-JHWT].
10. See TAMMY R. KOCHEL, ASSESSING THE INITIAL IMPACT OF THE MICHAEL
BROWN SHOOTING AND POLICE AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO IT ON ST. LOUIS COUNTY
RESIDENTS’ VIEWS ABOUT POLICE, S. ILL. UNIV. CARBONDALE DEP’T OF CRIMINOLOGY
& CRIM. JUST., 2015, at 10–11, http://opensiuc.lib.siu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?ar
ticle=1001&context=ccj_reports [https://perma.cc/P7MZ-TSNN]; Laurie Frankel
et al., A Year After Michael Brown, the Body Cam Business is Booming, CNN (2015),
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ence these situations and their outcomes. A recording could have been
either incriminating or exculpatory. At that time, the public appeared to
embrace BWC recordings as an opportunity to monitor—and potentially
check—police use of power, while law enforcement perceived the adoption of BWCs as an opportunity to bolster transparency and accountability.11 Generally speaking, the key parties—including law enforcement
advocacy groups and activists—have embraced BWCs. However, the need
to protect the privacy and security of police, victims, and the public is also
recognized and has been the focus of empirical and policy research.12 In
order to fully understand the impact of BWCs, implications for police,
both within their own departments and in their interactions with the pubic, must be better understood.
BWCs can influence policing in several key ways. Most apparently,
BWC-derived video footage can offer an objectively created version of
events that have transpired. Crucially, these videos provide an account
from the officer’s perspective before the application of force begins, perceived incivility takes place, or any aggression begins to characterize the
police-public encounter. BWCs can provide elements of a visual “story,”
thus contextualizing factual antecedents as well as potential reasons why
officers may apply force in these volatile engagements. The following aspect is critical: when citizens video-record an aggressive police-public interaction, it is nearly always after-the-fact or as the parties have already
entered into a combative stage. The potential abuse, the perceived sense
of danger or the presence of a concealed firearm, the “tunnel vision” officers experience as a result of the flight-or-fight dilemma, or the suspect’s
demeanor are rarely captured on film when the encounter is not recorded
from their own perspective. Mandatory BWC use policies are also more
likely to capture all of an event, regardless if the encounter begins as benign or confrontational and irrespective of the presence of third parties or
passive surveillance cameras. Once collected, video evidence overcomes
many of the limitations of human memory, which can be especially fallible
http://money.cnn.com/video/news/2015/08/07/ferguson-michael-brown-policebody-cameras-taser-digital-ally-vievu.cnnmoney/index.html [https://perma.cc/
TM4S-LSLU].
11. See, e.g., E. Fieldstadt, Should Every Police Officer be Outfitted with a Body Camera?, NBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2014, 03:30 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
michael-brown-shooting/should-every-police-officer-be-outfitted-body-cameran256881 [https://perma.cc/9SHH-5ZNJ]; Robert King & Jill Disis, Push for IMPD
Body Cams Follows Police Shooting of Teen, INDYSTAR (Aug. 11, 2015, 04:28 PM), http:/
/www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/08/11/push-impd-body-cams-follows-policeshooting-teen/31482109/ [https://perma.cc/M6Y3-GT7C]; Jay Stanley, Police
Body-Mounted Cameras: With Right Policies in Place, a Win for All, ACLU (2013),
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/police_body-mounted_cameras-v2
.pdf [https://perma.cc/W8V8-H5YR].
12. See, e.g., Kami Chavis Simmons, Body-Mounted Police Cameras: A Primer on
Police Accountability vs. Privacy, 58 HOWARD L.J. 881, 885 (2014); Kelly Freund, Note,
When Cameras are Rolling: Privacy Implications of Body-Mounted Cameras on Police, 49
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 96 (2015); Stanley, supra note 11.
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in the type of high-stress situations in which law enforcement takes
place.13 In many cases, such as the Ferguson shooting, even a limited record could have provided context to a tragic event and shaped the subsequent responses, and certainly, a body-cam could have created a dramatic
episode in America’s relationship with its police. Unsurprisingly, video evidence can be considered, under the right circumstances, more reliable
than officers’ own accounts, and therefore to have greater evidentiary
value.14 Having video supporting the officer’s—or citizen’s—depiction of
events, therefore, can lead to increased perceptions of police accountability when official reports and testimony can be corroborated with additional data.15
Research on BWCs has only recently begun to expand outside of the
potential impact on complaints and use of force.16 Researchers are now
exploring both the advantages of BWCs (e.g., increasingly available evidence, perceptions of legitimacy, public disclosure, and transparency) but
also the potential disadvantages (e.g., fiscal costs, privacy concerns, and
increased aggression against officers) in a number of contexts. As part of
this stage of analysis, the inquiry must also shift inward and examine how
implementing a mandatory BWC policy can change the subjective experience of policing. When officers are required to record all their interactions with the public, it may change how they perceive their relationship
with the citizenry and with their own department. In extreme circumstances, the BWCs may spawn a range of counterproductive reactions from
dissatisfied officers including de-policing or inertia, both of which undermine the goals of law enforcement and public safety.17 A balanced BWC
policy can encourage officers to engage in a recorded interaction with the
13. See, e.g., Kathy Pezdek, Fallible Eyewitness Memory and Identification, in AMERIPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, CONVICTION OF THE INNOCENT: LESSONS FROM
PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 105, 113–20 (Brian L. Cutler ed., 2012); Brian L. Cutler
et al., Improving the Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: Putting Context into Context,
72 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 629, 629–30 (1987); Michael R Leippe, Effects of Integrative
Memorial and Cognitive Processes on the Correspondence of Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence, 4 L. & HUMAN BEHAV. 261, 264–67 (1980); Ahmed M. Megreya & A. Mike
Burton, Matching Faces to Photographs: Poor Performance in Eyewitness Memory (Without
the Memory), 14 J. EXP. PSYCHOL. APPLIED 364, 364–65 (2008).
14. See, e.g., CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., CTR. FOR VIOLENCE PREVENTION & CMTY.
SAFETY, AZ. STATE UNIV., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OFFICER WORN BODY CAMERAS
IN THE PHOENIX POLICE DEPARTMENT 5 (2014); ALEXANDRA MATEESCU ET AL., DATA
& SOC’Y RESEARCH INST., POLICE BODY-WORN CAMERAS 6 (2015).
15. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 71 (2006); Ariel et al., The
Effects of Body-Worn cameras (BWCs) on Police and Citizen Outcomes: A State-of-the-Art
Review, POLICING: INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. (forthcoming 2017);
Timothy IC Cubitt, et al., Body-Worn Video: A Systematic Review of Literature, 50 AUSTRAL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 379, 379–81 (2016).
16. Cynthia M. Lum et al., CTR. FOR EVIDENCE BASED CRIME POL’Y, GEORGE
MASON UNIV., EXISTING AND ONGOING BODY WORN CAMERA RESEARCH: KNOWLEDGE
GAPS AND OPPORTUNITIES 3–4, 7–10 (2015).
17. See Barak Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum: Explaining Why Police BodyWorn Cameras “Work” or “Backfire” in Aggressive Police–Public Encounters, POLICING: J.
POL. & PRAC., 2017, at 1 (2017) [hereinafter Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum].
CAN
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understanding that the resulting video could be reviewed to either support them, for example as a defense against claim of excessive force, or to
contradict them, perhaps as evidence of failing to follow departmental policy in a disciplinary hearing.
Research in this line of inquiry—that is, the potential influence of
using BWCs on officers’ perceptions of accountability, oversight, and departmental culture—is scant. Some evidence suggests that officers hold
generally positive views regarding the implementation of BWCs, while
other studies show cynicism and concerns about the prospects of BWCs.18
Yet collectively, the body of research remains largely selective and descriptive. This Article reports the results of a survey of law enforcement officers
designed to examine how their beliefs about departmental culture and
internal accountability are influenced by BWCs. Administered in two
stages, one before and one after the start of mandatory BWC usage, this
survey inquired about several aspects of law enforcement culture not previously explored from an officer’s perspective: departmental identity, decision-making, accountability, and managerial oversight related to BWCs.
After providing a brief overview of the relevant literature, we present our
methodology and analytical approach followed by the results of this analysis and a discussion of the implications for policy and practice.
I. BACKGROUND
BWCs are designed with a specific goal: to record with as much detail
as possible the actions and conduct of law enforcement officers, members
of the public that interact with these officers, and the situations in which
they are involved. In many ways, the resulting record is the primary advantage offered by the camera. The utility of these videos has been the focal
point of much of the empirical research on BWCs. Just like the NFL’s
referees will use an instant replay to confirm a decision made on the field
or the outcome of a play, a post-interaction review can provide management and departmental leadership with the opportunity to review an officer’s decision. This opens the officer’s decision and their actions—much
of which are made in the heat of a moment and over a matter of mere
seconds—up to additional levels of scrutiny. This potential for critique is
true even when the subject of the recording is not as dramatic as a policeinvolved shooting, such as determination of whether an officer was following departmental regulations regarding conduct, dress, location, or other
non-law-enforcement-related duties. In some cases, this secondary review
can go beyond the parameters of the incident itself, possibly including the
conduct of the officer well before or after the event took place. These
factors are likely to influence the nature and tone of the culture within the
law enforcement organization, as well as contribute to a shift in the dy18. See e.g., Janne E. Gaub et al., Officer Perceptions of Body-Worn Cameras Before
and After Deployment: A Study of Three Departments, 19 POLICE Q. 275, 278 (2016).
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namic between managers and officers.19 Accordingly, while the use of
BWCs offers discrete and tangible benefits, as we outline here, mandatory
recording policies while in the field may also fundamentally alter the experience of being a police officer, especially regarding how officers perceive
their role within the agency.
Several lines of research across multiple disciplines of science suggest
that people alter their behavior once they are made aware that they are
being observed.20 A rich body of evidence on perceived social-surveillance, self-awareness,21 and socially-desirable-responding22 proposes that
people adhere to social norms and change their conduct simply due to
their cognizance that someone else is—or could be—watching.23 It seems
that knowing with sufficient certainty that behavior is being observed or
judged affects various social-cognitive processes: an individual experiences
self-awareness,24 they become more prone to socially-acceptable-behavior,25 and they sense a heightened need to cooperate with rules.26 Within
the BWC context, when behavior, attitudes, or demeanor are recorded,
and an individual is subsequently made aware that they can be penalized
because of the implicating footage, the subject’s behavior may change. In
this case, deterrence is said to have taken place.
For both officers and offenders, getting caught doing something illegal, morally wrong, or simply socially unacceptable can potentially lead to
19. See, e.g., Ronald J. Deluga & Joanne Souza, The Effects of Transformational
and Transactional Leadership Styles on the Influencing Behaviour of Subordinate Police
Officers, 64 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 49, 51 (1991); Bethan
Loftus, Police Occupational Culture: Classic Themes, Altered Times, 20 POLICING & SOC.
1, 1 (2010); Eugene A. Paoline III, Taking Stock: Toward a Richer Understanding of
Police Culture, 31 J. CRIM. JUST. 199, 200–01 (2003).
20. See, e.g., EDWARD ELLSWORTH JONES & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE ACTOR AND
THE OBSERVER: DIVERGENT PERCEPTIONS OF THE CAUSES OF BEHAVIOR 80, 85–88
(1971).
21. See generally Robert A. Wicklund, Objective Self-Awareness, 8 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 233 (1975).
22. See, e.g., Delroy L. Paulhus, Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding
(BIDR), 2 MEASUREMENT & CONTROL RESPONSE BIAS 37, 38 (1988).
23. See, e.g., Barak Ariel et al., The Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras on Use of
Force and Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police: A Randomized Control Trial, 31 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 509, 511 (2014) [hereinafter Ariel et al., The Effects of
Police Body-Worn Cameras].
24. See generally Shelley Duval & Robert A. Wicklund, Effects of Objective SelfAwareness on Attribution of Causality, 9 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 17 (1973);
Will M. Gervais & Ara Norenzayan, Analytic Thinking Promotes Religious Disbelief, 336
SCIENCE 493 (2012).
25. See, e.g., Lee Sproull et al., When the Interface Is a Face, 11 HUM.-COMPUTER
INTERACTION 97, 101 (1996).
26. See, e.g., Pat Barclay & Robb Willer, Partner Choice Creates Competitive Altruism in Humans, 274 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 749,
749 (2007); Manfred Milinski et al., Reputation Helps Solve the “Tragedy of the Commons”, 415 NATURE 424, 424 (2002); Claus Wedekind & Victoria A. Braithwaite, The
Long-Term Benefits of Human Generosity in Indirect Reciprocity, 12 CURRENT BIOLOGY
1012, 1012 (2002).
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negative consequences. This is an outcome rational individuals tend to
avoid.27 Of course, assuming rationality in decision-making processes has
increasingly been found to be a rather weak assumption,28 but the fact
remains that experimental research in this area has uncovered a common
propensity to avoid negative outcomes. The findings of these studies generally agree in that individuals become increasingly compliant when
presented with even the slightest cues indicating that somebody may be
watching. Priming and other contextual data signal to people how they
ought to behave, and these signals can inculcate fear of reputational damage to feelings of shame and aversion to the consequences of
noncompliance.29
BWCs provide a venue and medium for the recording of law enforcement related interactions that cannot normal be preserved. Therefore, it
is hypothesized that the self-awareness that arises from being watched or
filmed drives individuals to comply with rules or norms primarily because
of the perceived certainty of punishment. In the language of deterrence
theory, cameras are viewed as “credible threats”30 and individuals will
change their behavior—often for the better—because of their presence.
Several authors have demonstrated some of the necessary conditions in
which deterrence exerts an effect on criminal decision-making.31 This
framework, although developed to explain how potential victims and alleged offenders react in the presence of BWCs, applies to citizens and to
27. See, e.g., Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 741 (1989); Daniel S.
Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & JUST. 199, 243 (2013).
28. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 129–37 (2011).
29. It is worth noting, however, that the theoretical basis for BWCs, set out in
the previous paragraph, rests on citizen and officer awareness of being filmed. As
Ariel et al. discusses, the intervention in the Rialto Experiment was not simply the
presence of cameras. See Ariel et al., supra note 23, at 510. In addition, officers
were tasked to verbally warn citizens that their encounter was being recorded. See
id. at 520. In a different study Ariel et al. hypothesize that:
[t]his verbal warning could sensitize people leading them to modify their
behavior. It could also serve to remind people of the rules that are in
effect—politeness being the bare minimum—[sic]. Similarly, the verbal
prompt may jolt individuals into thinking a little more before they act,
becoming more deliberative and reflecting on future consequences. In
short, there could be several mechanisms that may account for changes
in behavior when camera and verbal warning are used together.
Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”: A Global Multistate Controlled Trial on
the Effect of Police-Body Worn Cameras on Citizens’ Complaints Against the Police, 44
CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 293, 298 (2017) [hereinafter Ariel et al., “Contagious
Accountability”].
30. See Robert Jervis, Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 41 WORLD POLS.
183, 190 (1989); see also Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, Imprisonment and
Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 AM. SOC. CRIMINOLOGY, 13, 19 (2011) (“For criminal decisions, what matters is the subjective probability a potential criminal assigns
to apprehension . . . .”).
31. See generally Daniel S. Nagin et al., Deterrence, Criminal Opportunities, and
Police, 53 CRIMINOLOGY 74 (2015); Thomas A. Loughran et al., Re-Examining the
Functional Form of the Certainty Effect in Deterrence Theory, 29 JUST. Q. 712 (2012).
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police equally. Officer compliance with police regulations would be affected in a similar way, as the certainty of officers being sanctioned for
non-compliance with laws or rules is more likely to occur in the face of an
actual violation when cameras are on.
A. BWCs Impact Law Enforcement Outcomes
There is a growing body of empirical support for the claims that
BWCs are a tool for reducing use of force by officers and citizen complaints. In a randomized, controlled trial of body-worn cameras by Ariel et
al., officers in the treatment group—those wearing a BWC—had one-half
the number of use-of-force incidents compared to a control group of officers with no BWC.32 In a study conducted in Mesa, Arizona, researchers
found that the rate of use-of-force by officers was reduced by 75% compared to the year before BWC adoption.33 At the same time, there were
40% fewer formal citizen complaints filed against BWC-wearing officers
than those with no BWCs in the comparison group.34 While these reductions appear to be positive, fewer complaints and use of force could also
be the direct consequence of a self-initiated reduction in officer’s policing
activity. In essence, BWCs might cause officers to refrain from engaging
with the public in some situations due to concerns about what may appear
on the BWC recordings. During one study, officers in Mesa, Arizona for
example, completed fewer stop-and-frisk searches and arrests when wearing BWCs.35 The reduction in stop-and-frisk events may be evidence of a
reduction in officer engagement as these events are triggered by the officer’s situational judgement; there is no obligation to act as there is when
a crime is taking place. Stop-and-frisk activity is based on the holding in
Terry v. Ohio,36 which allows an officer to stop a person for questioning
when they believe there is reasonable suspicion. Reasonable suspicion is
determined entirely from the officer’s point of view as Terry allows officers
to use their experience as a factor when determining whether they believe
criminal activity is taking place. BWCs could affect officers’ discretionary
stops as officers may feel a third person watching their BWC footage might
not perceive the footage in the same way and complete fewer stops, as
32. See Ariel et al., The Effects of Police Body-Worn Cameras, supra note 23, at 512.
33. See id.; RYAN STOKES & LEE RANKIN, MESA, AZ. POLICE DEP’T, PROGRAM
EVALUATIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS: ON-OFFICER BODY CAMERA SYSTEM (2013),
http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/documents/pdfs/LEIM/Operational%20
Track%20Workshops/O2%20On%20Body%20Cameras.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S697-L7W2].
34. See STOKES & RANKIN, supra note 33; CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMPLEMENTING A BODY-WORN CAMERA PROGRAM: RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 6 (2014), https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/copsp296-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL3N-2L8G].
35. See Justin T. Ready & Jacob T.N. Young, The Impact of On-Officer Video Cameras on Police–Citizen Contacts: Findings from a Controlled Experiment in Mesa, AZ, 11 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 445, 445 (2015).
36. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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evidenced in the findings from the study conducted in Mesa. Quite simply, if fewer discretionary stops are conducted the rates of complaints will
go down, even if the relative frequency of the negative behavior remains
constant. However, evidence gathered during a study in the Isle of Wight
in England demonstrated that the number of complaints specifically generated from searches in that context were lowered in parallel to arrests in
the presence of BWCs.37 Similarly, citizen complaints declined 65% when
BWCs were introduced in Orlando, Florida, although it is unknown how
many of those complaints stemmed from stop-and-frisk activity compared
to other routine—or obligatory—law enforcement actions.38 While these
findings are concerning, they still cannot clearly specify the influence of
BWCs on these outcomes. Disaggregating data to demonstrate the effects
of stop-and-frisk complaints and other complaints should be completed in
every BWC study, as it is unclear how officers may respond to BWCs. If
they decrease the rate of proactive police activity, then crime may increase.
Therefore, understanding officers’ perceptions about BWCs is an important variable to study when considering the implementation and impact of
BWCs.
Recently, Ariel et al.39 have replicated the early BWCs experiments in
a global, multisite, randomized controlled trial designed to dramatically
increase the evidence available on BWCs and how they can impact policing. Of particular importance, these findings highlight the complicated
interaction between officer beliefs, discretionary police action, and the effects of BWCs. Two major findings emerged. First, the study showed complaints by members of the public against officers fell dramatically over
twelve months compared with the year before. The findings showed there
were 113 complaints made against officers during the year trial period,
compared with 1,539 in the twelve months before—a reduction of 93%.
Secondly, the experiments overall concluded that BWCs had no effect on
the police use of force. However, when the data were broken down in
terms of officers’ discretion—that is, if and when officers decided to switch
37. See TOM ELLIS ET AL., U. PORTSMOUTH INST. CRIM. JUST. STUD., EVALUATION
PERSONAL ISSUE BODY WORN VIDEO CAMERAS (OPERATION
HYPERION) ON THE ISLE OF WIGHT: FINAL REPORT TO HAMPSHIRE CONSTABULARY
37–43 (2015).
38. See Wesley G. Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact of Police Officer Body-Worn
Cameras (BWCs) on Response-to-Resistance and Serious External Complaints: Evidence from
the Orlando Police Department (OPD) Experience Utilizing a Randomized Controlled Experiment, 43 J. CRIM. JUST. 480, 480 (2015) [hereinafter Jennings et al., Evaluating the
Impact].
39. See generally Barak Ariel et al., “Contagious Accountability”, supra note 29;
Barak Ariel et al., Increases in Police Use of Force in the Presence of Body-Worn Cameras are
Driven by Officer Discretion: A Protocol-Based Subgroup Analysis of Ten Randomized Experiments, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 453 (2016) [hereinafter Ariel et al., Driven
by Officer Discretion]; Barak Ariel et al., Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against
Officers and Does Not Reduce Police Use of Force: Results from a Global Multi-Site Experiment, 13 EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY 744 (2016) [hereinafter Ariel et al., Wearing Body
Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers].
OF THE INTRODUCTION OF
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on the cameras—the findings became more nuanced but telling. In experimental sites where officers followed the protocol, which dictated using
BWCs during each encounter, without discretion, use of force rates
dropped by nearly 40%. Darren Henstock and Barak Ariel have recently
observed that the suppressing effect of BWCs on use of force concentrates
in the lower end of the use of force spectrum—hand-to-hand combat—
with unnoticeable effect on use of force involving batons, pepper sprays,
K-9 units, Tasers, or lethal weapons.40 On the other hand, in departments
where officers were given the power to assess the value of the device on a
case-by-case basis, use of force rates were about 70% higher compared to
police shifts in which officers were not equipped with BWCs. These unintended consequences are largely a result of the way in which cameras were
deployed and used. Put differently, these findings indicated that BWCs
could reduce police use of force—with respect both to types of cases and
to individual incidents—but when officers are granted the power to activate the cameras based on their views, BWCs can have a significant and
negative effect; they can backfire. It follows that BWCs ought to be
switched on, and the recording announced to suspects at the earliest stage
of interaction between police and public—which we discuss more granularly below.
B. Officers Accept BWCs, with Qualifications
An emerging body of research has sought to examine how officers
perceive BWCs, often regarding their expectations for the efficacy of the
program, the response of the public, as well as their peer officers. Multiple studies have sought to examine the levels of officer support for—or
opposition to—BWC policies through surveys conducted in conjunction
with larger, empirical evaluations. For example, one prospective survey
found that sixty percent of officers in Orlando, Florida, believed the
agency should adopt BWCs.41 Half of the command staff in Sunshine
County, consisting of twenty-seven police agencies, supported adoption if
they already had deployed BWCs in their agency and varied from strongly
agree to disagree if implementation had not yet occurred.42 In Phoenix,
Arizona, officers thought BWC footage would help in the prosecution of
their cases.43 Similarly, officers in England’s Isle of Wight reported a
strong belief that the BWCs would improve evidence gathering.44 Some
agencies found while officers believe that BWCs could improve police ac40. See Darren Henstock & Barak Ariel, Testing the Effects of Police Body-Worn
Cameras on Use of Force During Arrests: A Randomised Controlled Trial in a Large British
Police Force, EUR. J. CRIMINOLOGY, 2017, at 1.
41. See Wesley G. Jennings et al., Cops and Cameras: Officer Perceptions of the Use
of Body-Worn Cameras in Law Enforcement, 42 J. CRIM. JUST. 549, 550 (2014).
42. See John Ortiz Smykla et al., Police Body-Worn Cameras: Perceptions of Law
Enforcement Leadership, 41 AM. J.CRIM. JUST. 424, 434–39 (2016).
43. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 14, at 23, 25.
44. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 37, at 11, 13.
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countability, they do not believe that the cameras would have the ability to
significantly improve public trust in law enforcement.45
Surveys have generally covered officers and command staff perceptions surrounding the use of BWCs,46 though there is a high degree of
variation between departments. For example, officers from cities close to
each other such as Tempe and Phoenix, Arizona, had different perceptions concerning the utility of BWC footage as evidence—ranging from
very positive to very negative.47
BWC-derived video does not pose only a challenge to the exercise of a
police officer’s duty, as they may perceive this obligation. These videos
can also support the officer’s testimony in court, boosting the officer’s
credibility and trustworthiness and validating the officer’s version of events
for internal affairs.48 Having video evidence has been shown to lower the
amount a that city pays out in a civil suit related to police actions and, in
some cases, it can prevent the city from having to pay a plaintiff at all.49 In
Phoenix, Arizona, the majority of officers surveyed agreed that BWC video
would improve the overall quality of evidence.50 In Orlando, Florida, after a year of using BWC officers, 64.1% of the officers thought reviewing
BWC video could help them improve police/citizen interactions, 79.5%
thought it helped them reduce reporting errors, and 92.3% thought it
would assist them with recollecting previous events.51 However, these benefits are linked to the outcomes of cases or incidents and are less influential on the type of conduct officers engage in daily basis, including Terry
stops. Among those departments where there was a high degree of opposition of BWCs, in the officer’s minds, quite simply, the benefits of BWCs
might not outweigh the disadvantages.52
An acceptance of the use of BWCs as a part of modern policing may
have seemed inevitable in some departments. Media coverage has been
relentless in some areas, with oversight agencies and the public seeking
out video recordings on a wide range of police-citizen interaction. This
does not mean, however, that patrol officers have fully embraced the no45. See Justice Tankebe & Barak Ariel, Cynicism Towards Change: The Case of
Body-Worn Cameras Among Police Officers, 6, 12 (Hebrew University Jerusalem Legal
Research Paper Series No. 16-42, 2016).
46. See generally Gaub et al., supra note 18; Tankebe & Ariel, supra note 45;
Smykla et al., supra note 42.
47. See Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 292–93.
48. Cf. CHARLES M. KATZ ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PHOENIX, ARIZONA, SMART POLICING INITIATIVE: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF
POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS 6–10 (2015), http://www.utility.com/perch/
resources/phoenix-smart-policing-study-sept-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM6J7VBV]; William H. Sousa et al., Research on Body Worn Cameras: Meeting the Challenges
of Police Operations, Program Implementation, and Randomized Controlled Trial Designs,
19 POLICE Q. 363, 366, 372 (2016).
49. See, e.g., Mateescu et al., supra note 14, at 27.
50. See KATZ ET AL., supra note 43, at 4–5, 23.
51. See Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact, supra note 38, at 484.
52. See Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 285.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 5 [2017], Art. 5

1016

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 1005

tion of being recorded when provided the opportunity to push back
against these policies. For example, in Essex, U.K., only 17% of the officers studied turned on their BWCs as required during domestic violence
incidents.53 Other studies have found that without strict oversight, officers often do not activate their BWCs as required or otherwise fail to
generate usable recording of their interactions. For example, in the Isle
of Wight BWC study, only 70 of the 80 officers who were assigned to the
experimental group wore the cameras, and 44 of the 70 officers completed the survey.54 In other experiments in England, the level of activation was undeterminable, as implementation rates were not captured.55
This disconnect between official policy and officer actions evidence has
two key points: First, officers may not be overly and universally enthusiastic
about BWC usage, even when their presence is accepted, and secondly,
management and street officers may view the BWCs, as well as the goals
and results of mandatory use policies, quite differently.
The nature of any given BWC policy, as well as the decision to
purchase BWCs in the first place, is usually determined by the executive
command or leadership of a law enforcement agency. While in some
cases these decisions are made due to recommendations by oversight committees or consent decrees, the imposition of a BWC program is a topdown decision.56 Executive command in most police agencies rarely go
out to patrol and handle calls for service; thus, the adoption of BWCs has
little effect on their day-to-day jobs. However, the effect on the front-line
officers is immense. If the adoption of BWCs reduce officer morale or
sends a message of distrust between management and the officers, then
BWCs could have many potential negative effects that have yet to be explored. This Article examines the attitudes of officers towards the department during the deployment of BWCs to determine how their perceptions
shift over time, as they adopt this new technology.
C. BWCs Are Likely to Influence Departmental Culture
Technological innovation has long been regarded a significant factor
in the development of new police practices and the shaping of law enforcement culture.57 This is not a characteristic unique to policing; a
change in essential technology can be stressful for an employee in a wide
53. See CATHERINE OWENS ET AL., COL. OF POLICING, THE ESSEX BODY WORN
VIDEO TRIAL 10 (2014), http://www.bwvsg.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/ 07/
BWV_ReportEssTrial.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8QN-FMQW].
54. See ELLIS ET AL., supra note 37, at 13.
55. See LYNNE GROSSMITH ET AL., COL. OF POLICING, POLICE, CAMERA, EVIDENCE: LONDON’S CLUSTER RANDOMISED CONTROLLED TRIAL OF BODY WORN VIDEO
11 (2015).
56. See, e.g., Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 281.
57. See generally James Byrne & Gary Marx, Technological Innovations in Crime
Prevention and Policing. A Review of the Research on Implementation and Impact, 20 J.
POLICE STUDS. 17 (2011); Neil Wain & Barak Ariel, Tracking of Police Patrol, 8 POLICING 274 (2014).
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range of employment contexts.58 However, the exceptional nature of the
law enforcement environment can often complicate the adoption, implementation, and usage of new technologies, often resulting in unintended
or antithetical results.59 BWCs, with implications for technological innovation, officer privacy, and the decision-making strategies of police leadership, are certainly no exception.
BWC recordings and the devices that create them are, on their faces,
relatively straightforward technologies. The implications of being
“watched” or “Monday morning quarterbacked,” however, are not, especially for officer who must make decisions quickly and in stressful situations.60 The thought of every action being examined for error after an
incident, is far reaching. It has been recognized that people change behavior when they are being watched.61 and demonstrate different conduct
when they are being unknowingly observed. For example, survey data
does not match actual data on the prevalence of behavior when asking
people about potentially embarrassing conduct such as infidelity, sex, pornography, or political opinions.62 Quite simply, people change behavior if
they know others can watch their reactions, interactions, and activity.
BWCs provide exactly this type of objective, constant observation.
Trust is an important component of employee satisfaction in policing,
as it is in most jobs.63 In this context, satisfaction is described as the difference between the expectations and reality of the job.64 Research on BWCs
has demonstrated that there is a potential for the imposition of a BWC
policy to influence this dynamic. Studies have demonstrated that officer
opinions on BWCs are more negative when agencies have yet to employ
BWCs as compared to agencies that have already adopted the technology.65 This differential highlights the differences between expectations
and reality within the BWC paradigm. Without experience, employees do
58. See, e.g., Wanda J. Orlikowski & Debra C. Gash, Technological Frames: Making Sense of Information Technology in Organizations, 12 ACM TRANS. INF. SYST. 174
(1993).
59. See, e.g., Christopher S. Koper et al., Optimizing the Use of Technology in Policing: Results and Implications from a Multi-Site Study of the Social, Organizational, and
Behavioural Aspects of Implementing Police Technologies, 8 POLICING 212, 213–14
(2014).
60. Cf. MICHAEL D. WHITE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
POLICE OFFICER BODY-WORN CAMERAS: ASSESSING THE EVIDENCE 6, 7, 18 (2014),
https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p289-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B9CVE8W].
61. See, e.g., Kristen Munger & Shelby J Harris, Effects of an Observer on
Handwashing in a Public Restroom, 69 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 733, 733 (1989).
62. See, e.g., SETH STEPHENS-DAVIDOWITZ, EVERYBODY LIES: BIG DATA, NEW DATA
AND WHAT THE INTERNET CAN TELL US ABOUT WHO WE REALLY ARE 105–65 (2017).
63. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 178 (1988).
64. See, e.g., Edwin A. Locke, The Nature and Causes of Job Satisfaction, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 1297, 1300, 1306 (M.D.
Dunnette ed., 1976).
65. See, e.g., Smykla et al., supra note 42, at 426.
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not know what to expect from the departmental leadership and this, in
turn, may exacerbate concerns that BWC footage will be used to directly
monitor their police work and compliance with a range of regulations.
The fear of the unknown can create apprehension.66 Engaging officers in
the policy development process allows them to participate in the implementation process and can increase some positive perceptions, though
there is significant variation between departments.67 For example, in
Tempe, Arizona, officers’ opinions were taken into account when developing policing on the BWCs, and their survey responses were generally more
positive when compared to agencies where officers were not consulted.68
If employees are not involved in the adoption process, or when employees
feel “spied” on, as BWCs can be used to do, it can make employees dissatisfied with their work environment because of the perceived lack of trust.69
Additionally, officers involved in BWCs across seven police agencies in the
U.K. believed the cameras would not increase trust between the police and
the community, adding another component of trust.70 Besides ambivalent
feelings about executive management decisions and officer involvement in
the process, there are also pre-existing beliefs about the new technology to
examine.
Employees develop ideological frameworks concerning new technology based on prior experience, word of mouth, or similarity to previously
used technology.71 These frameworks structure how employees react to
new technology. In the case of BWC technology, officers often garner
most of their information about policing from word-of-mouth, policing
magazines, and other police agencies.72 In the case of policing, some officers can see the adoption of the technology as beneficial while others see
it as a disadvantage, with perceptions varying with regard to the underlying focus (crime prevention, accountability, transparency) and the nature
of the BWC program itself. Opinions are often formed prior to the imposition of BWC policies, as this technology is still emerging and few officers
would have a significant amount of previous experience. For example,
nearly 8 in 10 Mesa, Arizona Police Department officers thought BWCs
would cause them to act more professional.73 At the same time, others
thought that department should not purchase BWCs, and less than half
thought the other officers would welcome the technology.74 Departmen66. See, e.g., Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 284–85.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Jeffrey M. Stanton, Traditional and Electronic Monitoring from an
Organizational Justice Perspective, 15 J. BUS. & PSYCHOL. 129, 130 (2000).
70. See Tankebe & Ariel, supra note 45, at 6, 16.
71. See, e.g., Orlikowski & Gash, supra note 48, at 19.
72. See, e.g., Cynthia Lum et al., Receptivity to Research in Policing, 14 JUST. RES.
& POL’Y. 62, 71 (2012).
73. See WHITE, supra note 60, at 21.
74. See id. at 6.
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tal leadership may hold slightly divergent views. For example, over half of
the executive management in Sunshine County, Texas, believed officers
would not engage in necessary uses of force, that upkeep and maintenance would interfere with officers’ regular duties, and citizens would refuse to talk on camera.75 Notably, the magnitude of the beliefs held by
the executive management respondents in that jurisdiction varied based
on whether the agency had already adopted BWCs, demonstrating that
exposure to new technologies, like BWCs, can influence previously formed
ideological frameworks.
The presence of a BWC during active policing has, as demonstrated
here, the potential to influence law enforcement culture within an agency.
The cameras—and the recordings they create—are only part of the dynamic changes that can be introduced. The nature of the policy guidelines surrounding the BWCs is also significant, with the mandatory or
voluntary nature of the usage being of particular importance. Studies examining activation of the BWCs have found varying levels of compliance
with required activation policies.76 At the same time, ensuring that BWCs
are used systematically has been shown to be paramount to the success of
BWCs.77 While not without qualifications, “successful” BWCs activation
policies are characterized by reduced discretion, with only limited and
predetermined instances, case types, or victim categories excluded from a
mandatory activation policy; all other incidents must be recorded.78 This
is essential because BWCs cannot systemically record crucial evidence that
may provide—or challenge—the justification for the use of force, or the
decision to arrest if activation is not required ex-ante.79 As BWCs become
more commonplace in law enforcement and a wide range of polices are
implemented to support their usage, one of the most debated issues surrounds the limitation they impose on officers’ discretion and in which
contexts this is warranted. For decades, officers have been trained to apply their discretion on the applicability of the use-of-force, conducting
stop-and-frisk actions, the decision to arrest an individual, and more
broadly, on how best to handle victims and suspects. However, available
evidence suggests that when officers have the discretion to activate—or
not to activate—the BWCs are not only ineffective but can even backfire.80
75. See Smykla et al., supra note 42, at 432–33.
76. See, e.g., KATZ ET AL., supra note 48, at ii; Allyson Roy, On-Officer Video Cameras: Examining the Effects of Police Department Policy and Assignment on Camera Use and
Activation (May 2014) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Arizona State University) (on file
with Arizona State University), https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/134979/
content/Roy_asu_0010N_13803.pdf [https://perma.cc/F56V-5B47].
77. See Ariel et al., The Deterrence Spectrum, supra note 17, at 17.
78. See Ariel et al., Driven by Officer Discretion, supra note 39, at 457.
79. See, e.g., Jacob T.N. Young & Justin T. Ready, A Longitudinal Analysis of the
Relationship Between Administrative Policy, Technological Preferences, and Body-Worn
Camera Activation Among Police Officers, POLICING, 2016, at 10–12.
80. See Ariel et al., Driven by Officer Discretion, supra note 39, at 454; Ariel et al.,
Wearing Body Cameras Increases Assaults Against Officers, supra note 39, at 750–52.
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This sets up an environment in which BWCs may be perceived to be a tool
for the global limitation of officer discretion imposed by leadership or
management.
Shifts in beliefs about technology come about when first-order
changes (the development of more effective and evidence-based practices)
lead to second-order changes (subjective beliefs about these practice).81
Police technology is often adopted without employee input, or if it is, a
small committee, may be convened to decide which brand will be purchased; rarely is officer buy-in garnered before a technology is advanced in
policing. Police agencies often purchase technologies before they determine the effectiveness of the product.82 Both shifts in technological
frameworks and second-order changes only come about after officers have
gotten used to the technology and a chance to use it to their advantage.
Opinions before or at the beginning of use are most likely to be more
negative than after an employee establishes competency with the new technology.83 These shifts in beliefs about the technology can also extend to
shifts about the organization.84 If employees understand the level of monitoring a new technology will bring beforehand, this can prevent negative
opinions of the new technology.85
II. METHODOLOGY

AND

DATA

A. Settings
This survey was administered to the members of a large transit police
department (TPD) located in a major eastern American metropolitan city.
With approximately 250 sworn officers, this TPD has jurisdiction over approximately 2,200 square miles, including several subways, light rail and
bus lines, and the geographic areas around these mass transit systems.
With authorities and responsibilities that parallel those of major municipal
police departments, this TPD responded to approximately 57,624 incidents in calendar year 2016. Additionally, TPD officers work with federal
and local state law enforcement agencies on matters relating to counterterrorism, natural disasters, and public safety.
Implementation of the BWC program was independent of the research program and the authors were brought in as an independent evalu81. See, e.g., Jean M. Bartunek & Michael K. Moch, First-Order, Second-Order,
and Third-Order Change and Organization Development Interventions: A Cognitive Approach, 23 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 484, 486 (1987).
82. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, We Spend $100 Billion on Policing. We Have No Idea
What Works, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ posteverything/wp/2017/03/10/we-spend-100-billion-on-policing-we-have-no-ideawhat-works/?utm_term=.765e3462b932 [https://perma.cc/NQ6E-QMTV].
83. See, e.g., Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 282, 289–91.
84. See Tankebe & Ariel, supra note 45, at 9, 19–20.
85. See, e.g., Clay Posey et al., When Computer Monitoring Backfires: Invasion of
Privacy and Organizational Injustice as Precursors to Computer Abuse, 7 J. INFO. SYS. SECURITY 24, 38 (2011).
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ation team. This TPD had already decided to enact the department-wide
BWC program after a brief, internally-managed pilot period. The BWC
policy was developed by TPD management and leadership, with limited
input from officers outside those that volunteered for the pilot program.
In line with this policy, and beginning in January of 2016, all TPD officers
were required to wear a BWC at all times while on duty. Compliance with
this policy was mandatory at all times; failure to activate a BWC during an
incident, contact, or response was a violation of TPD rules and could subject an officer to disciplinary proceedings.
The start of the TPD-wide, mandatory BWC program represented a
significant change in the operational practices of this department. At the
time of the pre-BWC survey administration, only 13.6% of responding officers (n=17) had any previous experience with a BWC. By the time of the
post-BWC administration, all of the officers responding to the survey had
worn a BWC in the field and been subject to the obligations, benefits, and
sanctions for non-compliance of the BWC policy, as it had been in force
for over six months at that time.
B. Study Procedure
This survey was designed as a population-level survey, with all street
officers and managers participating in the study.86 Administration of the
survey took place in two discrete stages: “pre-BWC,” delivered in the
month before the BWC policy was fully implemented (January 2016), and
“post-BWC,” administered after approximately seven months had passed
(July 2016). Identical versions of the instrument were used in each stage,
although the questions reflected either expectations about BWCs and
BWC policy or ad hoc perceptions, mutatis mutandis.
The first administration (pre-BWC) took place during a period of increased staffing activity for the TPD. Prior to the administration, officers
received an e-mail from the research team requesting that they report to a
conference room in the same building as the TPD headquarters but
outside of the station itself. Several sessions, corresponding with shift
breaks, took place on the same day. Groups of officers who could not
attend the large-group meetings were targeted for secondary sessions (e.g.,
night shift officers, strike team) over the subsequent week. In each case,
participation and attendance were voluntary.
At the time of the pre-BWC administration, responding officers were
aware of the incoming policy and had been trained on the appropriate use
of the BWC units. Participating officers were not yet assigned their BWC
units nor were the provisions of the BWC policy enacted (e.g., recording,
storage, and review of recordings; disciplinary actions for failing to follow
86. Although the TPD leadership, including the chief, wear BWCs as a matter
of policy and use them when in the field, individuals in these roles were not
targeted in the survey administration, as the focus of this research is on the mean
level of subjective beliefs held by TPD officers.
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protocol). The second, post-BWC round of the survey focused on how
officers perceived that their beliefs about BWCs might have changed, after
approximately six months of regular usage. The survey instrument (including all individual items) substantively paralleled in this second round,
and the administration procedures were fundamentally similar.
Response rates to this survey were well above commonly acceptable
limits. There were 147 complete or partially-completed responses received to the pre-BWC survey. At that time, there were 155 eligible officers in the TPD, a response rate of 94.8%. One-hundred and fifty
complete or partially complete responses were received to the post-BWC
survey. At that time, there were 181 eligible officers in the TPD, returning
a response rate of 82.9%. A high response rate is necessary to ensure that
the general distribution of responses is representative of the overall department, as well as to limit the ability of biases to affect the results of the
study. A response rate that exceeds 60% is generally considered sufficiently large to allow researchers to draw generalizable conclusions about
a group of respondents. It should be noted that given the anonymous
nature of the study, it is impossible to know which officers participated in
the both, one, or neither round of the survey. Therefore, the overall design of this study is a repeated measure cross-sectional study.
C. Survey Instrument
The survey instrument used in this analysis was developed specifically
for use in this study. Designed to expand the range of inquiry beyond
direct perceptions of how BWCs may—or may not—impact crime rates
and community relations, the survey specifically inquired about changes in
departmental culture and leadership. Following Justice Tankebe and
Barak Ariel’s conceptualization of officer self-legitimacy in this context,87
items relating to internal procedural justice at the transit police department were integrated into the survey. The survey can be found in Table 3,
including vignettes on the nature of the moral and trust relationship between line officers and the transit police department administration.
Using a five-point Likert-style rating scale, respondents were asked to
rate the extent to which statements about the BWC policy were in line with
either their perceptions or the perceptions of their peer officers. A total
of forty-five statements were provided. The response scale ranged from
“strongly disagree” through “neutral” to “strongly agree” (values of 1, 3,
and 5, respectively, and after, reverse coding responses as needed). All
responses were completely anonymous; no identifying indications (e.g.,
badge number) were collected. Respondents were, however, also asked to
self-report several demographic and history factors: age, race, gender,
length of tenure with the department, and current rank. Respondents
also indicated if they had within the last five years been subject to any
disciplinary actions or had to use force in the line of duty.
87. See Tankebe & Ariel, supra note 45, at 23.
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D. Analytic Strategy
Within each of the two stages, mean (average) scores were calculated
on each of the sixteen items relevant to intradepartmental culture and
accountability. Independent-samples t-tests were employed to examine
significant differences in the overall responses to these items between the
pre- and post-test administrations. We have also computed standardized
mean differences for the treatment effect, presenting these in terms of
Cohen’s d,88 as measures of the magnitude of the differences between
these two stages. As a rule of thumb, d values of 0.2 represent small effect
sizes, 0.5 medium effect sizes, and any standardized mean difference of 0.8
or above is considered a large effect size.89
These analyses highlight how officer attitudes in this TPD changed
after the imposition of a new, mandatory BWC policy. While these data do
not capture the baseline beliefs of the department (an administration of
the survey prior to any knowledge of the BWC policy would have been
required for this and was not possible), they do demonstrate how attitudes
change from a policy in which activation of BWCs is left to the discretion
of the individual officer, onto a departmental policy where officers have
used the BWCs and worked under the rules and restrictions of the corresponding policy. In this way, they highlight how profoundly agencies can
be changed, in unanticipated ways, with the imposition of a mandatory
BWC policy.
III. RESULTS
The survey was administered in two stages, each time to the entire
active TPD roster. As shown in Table 1, the demographic profile of the
responding individuals did not differ meaningfully between administrations. No significant differences were observed in the race, gender, age,
or average length of service between respondents in each stage. For example, and regarding race, 60.5% of the pre-BWC respondents (n=109) selfreported as “white” and 54.6% (n=130) reported the same on the postBWC survey. The average age of all respondents was 41.3 years old and
40.4 years old in the pre- and post-BWC stages, respectively (p=.553). Although the anonymous nature of the data collection effort prevented the
collection of additional, individual-level data, the lack of significant differences, as well as general congruence with the overall profile of the TPD at
the time of both administrations, support assumptions of generalizability.

88. See JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS
§ 2.2, at 20 (2d ed. 1988).
89. See id. at 21.
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TABLE 1. SAMPLE DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE, PREPOST-BWC ADMINISTRATIONS
Pre-BWC
(n=147)
Race
Black
30.3%
White
60.6%
Hispanic
0.9%
Other
8.3%
Gender
Male
96.7%
Age at Administration
Age
41.3 (10.6)
Tenure at TPD
Months
171.3 (119.0)

AND

Post-BWC
(n=150)

p-value

28.5%
54.6%
3.8%
13.1%

0.760
0.358
0.151
0.235

95.6%

0.619

40.4 (11.2)

0.553

152.3 (114.2)

0.296

Substantively, variations in the officers’ perceptions were detected
when comparing the two stages on conceptual fronts. First, the TPD officers reported significant differences regarding the general culture within
the department that are attributable to the imposition of the BWC policy.
These results are shown in Table 2. Mean values for all responding officers are reported for the six survey items, as well as the corresponding
standard deviations, with responses divided by stage. In each case, this
value is the average score for all responses received to that item on the
five-point Likert-style scale. A score closer to one indicated an overall high
degree of disagreement with the statement, while values close to five result
from strong levels of agreement.
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TABLE 2. CHANGES IN OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF TPD CULTURE
ATTRIBUTABLE TO BWC POLICY
Pre-BWC
(n=147)

Post-BWC
(n=150)

p-values
Mean
Mean
scores
scores
(SD)
(SD)
BWCs & Departmental Culture
The BWC policy shows how
2.60 (1.14) 2.97 (1.13) 0.007
little management trusts
officers
BWCs will/has increase/d
3.96 (0.94) 3.74 (0.96)
the morale of the department
The department-wide
deployment of BWCs will
be/has been a positive
change
Overall TPD Identity
I feel a strong sense of
belonging to my police
department

0.052

3.42 (.977) 3.09 (1.03)

0.006

2.76 (1.27) 2.87 (1.17)

0.455

The department treats me
with respect and dignity

2.96 (1.17) 3.01 (1.16)

0.717

I am satisfied with my job

2.29 (1.13) 2.52 (1.18)

0.113

Cohen’s d
(95%
Confidence
Intervals)

-0.326
[(-0.555),
(-0.097)]
0.232
[(0.003),
(0.460)]
0.329
[(0.100),
(0.558)]

-0.09
[(-0.318),
(0.137)]
-0.043
[(-0.270),
(0.185)]
-0.199
[(-0.427),
(0.029)]

Significant differences were found between the pre- and post-BWC
administration about how the officers perceived the influence of BWCs on
the TPD culture, though their reported beliefs about the culture itself did
not significantly vary between stages. As shown in Table 2, the TPD officers reported a significant change in how they believe BWCs influence
departmental culture. In this case, the presence of the BWC program was
initially perceived as a negative development (M=2.60) in the department.
Over the course of the study period, overall perceptions became slightly
more adverse (M=2.97, p=.007), though still well within the neutral range.
Similarly, officers initially reported a fairly strong belief that the BWC program would damage the overall morale of the TPD (M=3.96) at the outset
of the policy. By the time of the second survey stage, this belief had significantly intensified (M=3.74, p=.052). It is worth noting, however, that the
average reported value remained fairly neutral and did not indicate an
overwhelmingly negative response from the officers. Finally, experience
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with BWCs appears to have had a significant effect on officer perceptions
about the policy itself. Prior to the start of the policy, officers reported
higher levels of disagreement with the notion that BWCs would be an overall positive development for the TPD (M=3.42), a fairly strong level of disagreement given the high number of neutral responses reported by officers
overall. After using the BWCs for six months, this belief had changed significantly, with officers reported a more neutral average belief (M=3.09,
p=.006). The magnitude of this difference is the largest for this set of
questions (d=.329, 95% CI .100, .557). While hardly an overwhelming endorsement of the BWC policy during the early stage of the administration,
the changes over time suggest that officer acceptance reduced with exposure to, and experience with, BWCs.
At the same time, the start of the BWC program, as well as six months
of working under the conduct rules imposed by that policy, did not impact
other measures of general TPD culture. Notably, reported levels of belonging within the TPD did not vary significantly (p=.455), with overall
negligible effect sizes. With an average of 2.76 (pre-BWC) and 2.87 (postBWC) officers consistently reported slight disagreement with statements
regarding their engagement. Similarly, officers remained neutral and
consistent about the level of respect and dignity they felt the TPD accorded them (pre: M=2.96, post: M=3.01, p=.717).
The BWC policy required that officers record a wide variety of interactions, including those with the public, other officers, and potential victims
and offenders. The existence of these videos could have influenced
officer perceptions of managerial oversight, accountability, and the
decision-making processes within the TPD. The results of this analysis are
presented in Table 3.
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TABLE 3. CHANGES IN OFFICER PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY,
OVERSIGHT, AND DECISION-MAKING ATTRIBUTABLE
TO BWC POLICY
Pre-BWC
(n=147)

Post-BWC
(n=150)

p-values
Mean
Mean
Scores
Scores
(SD)
(SD)
BWCs Influence on Accountability
BWCs will/have ensure/d
greater accountability in
2.88 (1.15) 2.60 (1.05) 0.034
police work
BWCs will/have improve/d
transparency in police work

3.01 (1.12) 2.83 (1.00)

When using a BWC, officers
will be/have become more
2.69 (0.99) 2.59 (0.90)
likely to follow departmental
regulations
BWCs will/are protecting
officers against false
2.17 (1.08) 2.06 (1.00)
allegations of misconduct
BWCs and Managerial Oversight

0.254
[(0.026),
(0.483)]
0.170
[(-0.058),
(0.398)]

0.370

0.106
[(-0.122),
(0.333)]

0.369

0.106
[(-0.122),
(0.333)]

0.009

-0.313
[(-0.542),
(-0.085)]

3.32 (1.12)

0.133

0.172
[(-0.056),
(0.400)]

3.13 (1.17)

0.413

3.01 (1.13)

0.348

3.43 (1.10)

0.024

3.09 (1.17)

0.418

BWCs are a tool for
2.24 (1.06) 2.59 (1.17)
management to track officers
BWCs will/have decrease/d
the number of internal
3.52 (1.20)
sanctions for violating
[TPD] policies
TPD Decision-Making Processes
Decisions by my supervisor
are always based on facts,
3.02 (1.16)
not personal biases
My supervisor takes account
of my needs when making
2.88 (1.20)
decisions that affect me
The department gives me an
explanation for the decisions 3.72 (1.09)
that affect me
The decisions of my
supervisor are equally fair to 2.97 (1.25)
every officer

0.160

Cohen’s d
(95%
Confidence
Intervals)
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The imposition of the BWC policy appears to have meaningfully influenced officer perceptions of some limited elements of internal accountability and managerial oversight within the TPD, though this differential
was not reflected universally across all of the items addressing these factors. In this study, officers reported a significant change in their beliefs
about accountability attributable to the BWC program. During the preBWC stage, respondents indicated a fairly neutral response to the survey
item that directly inquired about accountability (M=2.88). By the postBWC administration, the average response had become significantly more
negative (M=2.60; p=.034), indicating that officer felt that the BWC policy
has decreased their general levels of accountability. At the same time, responses to the item referencing transparency in police work did not significantly differ between the pre- (M=3.01) and post-BWC stages (M=2.83,
p=.160). Officers did not indicate a significant change in their perceptions of the role of BWCs in increasing compliance with TPD regulations
either (p=.370), nor the ability of a BWC recording to insulate officers
from allegations of misconduct (p=.369).
Experience with the BWC program did not debunk some officer concerns about the use of BWC recordings in managerial oversight and in fact
intensified these perceptions, though not to the level of statistical significance. Between the pre- (M=2.24) and post-BWC stages (M=2.59), officers
reported a significantly higher agreement with the item indicating that
BWCs were a tool to track officers (p=.009). However, officers consistently
disagreed with the idea that BWC video could decrease the number of
internal sanctions for violating TPD policies (p=.133). This suggests that,
while experience with policing while wearing a BWC demonstrated to the
officers that the TPD leadership was using the recordings as an oversight
mechanism (at least perceived to be doing so), they did not see any value,
at least about supporting claims of innocence during internal disciplinary
processes, of having those videos available for subsequent review.
Finally, it appears that the experience with BWCs had only a limited
impact on officer perceptions of their agency regarding the broader, internal decision-making process. At the pre-BWC administration, officers indicated to a fairly high degree that they did not get explanations for
decisions that affect them (M=3.72). After six months of policing under
the BWC policy, officers indicated a significantly lower level of disagreement (M=3.43), though the overall sentiment remained negative
(p=0.024). Officer resistance to the BWC policy may be evidenced in the
responses to the remaining items. Though failing to reach statistical significance, changes in officer perceptions of fairness (M diff.=0.116,
p=.418), fact-based decision-making (M diff.=0.112, p=.413), and supervisor accounting for individual needs (M diff.=0.129, p=.348), each became
more negative.
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IV. DISCUSSION
The results of this study show how the imposition of a mandatory usage BWC policy can influence the culture of a law enforcement agency
regarding perceptions of officer accountability and fairness. Here, the differences in average scores captured immediately before and six months
after such a policy began demonstrate that BWCs can have a significant
but potentially limited effect on important aspects of policing and the internal dynamics of a law enforcement agency. Interestingly, these effects
were mixed, with differing results for views of the BWC policy itself and
those regarding the TPD’s broader culture.
The most striking results center on the impact of BWCs on departmental culture. In this area, all three of the items changed significantly
between the pre- and post-BWC administrations. After six months of working under the BWC protocol, officers report a significantly higher measure
of disagreement with the idea that imposition of the BWC was a function
of managerial oversight of officers. Similarly, officers report a significantly
more positive perception of the influence of BWCs on overall officer morale and significantly less disagreement with the idea that BWCs represent
a positive change. Taken together, these findings suggest that officers may
have held a number of concerns about BWCs that, after working under
the policy, were proven to be unfounded.
Measure of TPD identity, as reported by the responding officers, did
not significantly vary. While we cannot attribute the changes to the BWC
policy, it is worth noting that the differences in average values on all three
of these items did not indicated a positive trend. Reported levels of belonging, respectful treatment and just satisfaction appeared to decrease
during the study. We must conclude, however and based on these results,
that the changes in values cannot be attributed to the BWC policy—nor
that these differences are nothing more than noise or natural variation in
these data.
When comparing the average scores on the items relating to accountability, officers reported significantly stronger agreement with the idea
that BWCs can increase the levels of overall accountability in police work.
While not reaching statistical significance, officers indicated that they perceived increased levels of transparency, increased conformity with TPD
regulations and an increased in the idea that BWC video can protect officers against false allegations. It is worth noting, however, that all of these
mean values indicate a relatively tepid endorsement of the changes, with
small mean differences and with most averages falling fairly close to the
“neutral” value.
Experience with the BWC appear to have had a fairly negative impact
on officer perception of managerial oversight with regard to the policy.
Significant increases, apparently related to the imposition of the
mandatory policy, were found in the average response to the item reflecting the use of BWCs as a tool to track officers during the study. At the
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same time, officers reported a non-significant increase in their agreement
with the idea that BWC video could be used to decrease the number of
internal sanctions for violating TPD policy. Taken together, the change in
this factor suggests that officers believe that TPD management is using the
BWCs to monitor their conduct, but that the outcome of this oversight are
not completely negative.
Lastly, officer beliefs about the overall decision-making processes in
the TPD—not limited to the BWCs themselves—are impacted in a limited
way by the imposition of the BWC policy. In this study, the officers reported a significantly lower agreement with the item stating that they are
provided explanations for the decisions that affect them. This suggests
that the mandatory nature of the BWC policy, in addition to the manner
in which it was administered, may have impacted the officers’ overall perception of how issues are resolved within the TPD.
A. Implications for Research and Policy
Overall, officers seem to have accepted the potential value of BWCs
after using them for some period. This suggests that initial resistance to
mandatory BWC policies can be overcome, especially after the real-world
benefits of BWC video have been demonstrated in practice. These benefits, however, come at a cost. It appears officer’s opinions of the TPD have
become more negative since the imposition of the BWC policy. Whereas
other agencies experienced an increase in the willingness to use BWCs,90
our TPD survey illustrated that the use of BWCs decreased rather than
enhanced the officer’s belief in departmental accountability and its transparency. Though failing to reach levels of statistical significance, BWCs
appear to have also reduced overall morale and contaminated the TPD’s
satisfaction with the explanations granted to them by management for the
decisions that are made within the agency and the justifications provided
for those decisions. The officers shared with us that, compared to the first
stage, they think that the department does not trust its officers. BWCs
were once believed to be used as a tracking tool for the officers, and with
the mandatory policy, this concern has been substantiated and negative
emotions have been exacerbated.
We argue that the reason for these unique results of this mandatory
BWC policy is the nature of the policy itself. As demonstrated here, there
is a strong theoretical underpinning for this argument: police culture focuses on the appropriate use of judgement, and when officers perceive
this individual discretion has been limited, there may be adverse effects
for culture, regardless of the benefits for public safety.
Officer buy-in can strongly influence perception of BWCs. In Phoenix, Arizona, for example, officers were not included in the discussion
about BWCs. In Tempe, Arizona, however, officers were asked their opinions about key BWC policies—including use of footage by supervisors,
90. See, e.g., Jennings et al., Evaluating the Impact, supra note 38, at 482–84.
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when to turn on cameras, and the use of video when writing reports—
prior to the imposition of the policy. Perhaps unsurprisingly in light of
these findings, the Tempe officers were much more receptive to the resulting policy when asked.91 Theories of organizational justice suggest that
the manner in which police agencies are perceived to treat their officers
can have beneficial outcomes when implementing controversial technology, including BWCs.92 In this case, officers appear to demonstrate a series of opinions that represent a perspective divergent from that of the
departmental leadership. Similar to the officers in Phoenix, the TPD respondents in this study may not believe that they had a proper voice in the
decision to adopt a BWCs policy (an important component of procedural
justice), or in the ways in which these devices ought to be deployed. The
resulting impact in Phoenix was a more negative perception of the BWCs
themselves, the focus of that study.93 Here, we show that this process may
also impact cultures of perceived accountability and transparency within
the agency.
The first point above may seem obvious, and indeed some officers will
be “early adopters” of the technology,94 however, agencies considering the
introduction of BWCs will inevitably have some officers who are reluctant
to wear intrusive surveillance devices. Aside from the common tendency
to favor the status quo above change of any kind,95 new technology is not
always embraced within organizations, and acceptance by the workforce
often relies on their perception of its usefulness96 and is linked to what
policies govern its use.97
However, while a mandatory activation policy was in place for the
Phoenix BWC trial, only 32% of encounters resulted in activation,98 indicating that policy alone is not sufficient for compliance, and other mechanisms are required to “institutionalize” the use of BWCs and thereby
increase activation levels. The alternative, a discretionary policy, may result in rates of activation that are so low the investment in the technology
would be unviable. In examining the effects of a discretionary policy in a
large United States police agency, Jacob T.N. Young and Justin T. Ready
noted that activations reduced by an average 31% when the policy was
91. See Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 289–91.
92. See, e.g., Justin Nix & Scott E. Wolfe, Sensitivity to the Ferguson Effect: The Role
of Managerial Organizational Justice, 47 J. CRIM. JUST. 12, 13, 16–17 (2016).
93. See Gaub et al., supra note 18, at 289–91.
94. See, e.g., Young & Ready, supra note 79, at 5, 14.
95. See, e.g., KAHNEMAN, supra note 28, at 119–29.
96. See, e.g., Viswanath Venkatesh & Fred D. Davis, A Theoretical Extension of the
Technology Acceptance Model: Four Longitudinal Field Studies, 46 MANAG. SCI. 186,
186–87 (2000).
97. See, e.g., Susan A. Brown et al., Do I Really Have to? User Acceptance of Mandated Technology, 11 EUR. J. INFO. SYS. 283, 283–84, 286 (2002).
98. See E.C. Hedberg et al., Body-Worn Cameras and Citizen Interactions with Police
Officers: Estimating Plausible Effects Given Varying Compliance Levels, 34 JUSTICE Q. 627,
640 (2017).
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changed from mandatory to discretionary, and among non-volunteers, activation rates dropped by half, compared to only a 15% reduction among
officers who had volunteered to wear the cameras.99 As a result, they recommended a mandatory activation policy if the wearing of BWCs was to be
compulsory.100
Activating during every encounter is desirable for maximizing the potential for a deterrence effect, as well as for avoiding the suspicion that
could arise around selective recording. A U.S. Department of Justice101
report noted the American Civil Liberties Union advocated for mandatory
recording other than for very clear and limited circumstances to avoid
allegations of selective recording or tampering. These advocates believe
the activation of cameras should be a “reflexive decision, and not something officers have to evaluate in every new situation.”102 Indeed, if cameras are available and not worn, or worse, worn and not activated during a
contentious encounter, it could cause suspicion as to the justification.
This undermines assumptions of transparency and the effect on public
confidence and hence legitimacy deficits may be more severe than if the
cameras were not available at all. At the same time, while recording every
encounter would be ideal, it is not always possible for reasons of privacy—
including an officer’s needs at certain times, as well as for reasons of legality and practicality. Consequently, policy and guidance are required
around when officers should or should not record. Some agencies opt for
a mandatory recording policy where every encounter must be recorded
with certain exemptions, such as meeting informants or interviewing victims of sexual assault. This was the policy adopted for the Rialto trial103
where other than for the above exemptions, the camera was to be worn for
the entire shift and every encounter recorded.
The U.S. Department of Justice Report into BWCs identified that very
few agencies had adopted a policy of recording every encounter but instead commonly required all “calls for service, and law enforcement related encounters” to be recorded, with certain exemptions.104 The report
recommended that agencies provide clear guidance to officers about
when to record and when not to, because the introduction of administrative policy has been demonstrated to affect officer actions in matters like
domestic violence, attendance, and police pursuits.105 The U.K. Home
99. See Young & Ready, supra note 79, at 10–12
100. See id. at 14.
101. See generally CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 34.
102. See id. at 12.
103. See Ariel et al., The Effect of Police Body-Worn Cameras, supra note 23, at 510.
104. See CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERVS., supra note 34, at 12.
105. See generally GEOFFREY P. ALPERT & ROGER G. DUNHAM, THE FORCE FACTOR: MEASURING POLICE USE OF FORCE RELATIVE TO SUSPECT RESISTANCE (Police
Executive Research Forum Washington, D.C., 1997); Lawrence W. Sherman &
Richard A. Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for Domestic Assault, 49 AM.
SOCIOL. REV. 261, 262–63 (1984).
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Office Guidelines on the use of BWCs runs to 113 pages.106 The point
being that activation and non-activation are not as simple and clear-cut as
members of the community might think if not aware of the many legal and
practical implications. It is a balancing act between discretion—a cornerstone in American policing—and the benefits that might arise from using
BWCs in the field. While a mandatory policy would seem to be the solution, it is not a panacea and—based on our results—can backfire in terms
of officers’ perceptions.
B.

Methodological Limitations

One difficulty in interpreting before-after studies is the lack of control
over rival hypotheses. Short of random assignment into treatment and
control conditions—or random assignment of departments with and without BWCs policies—all conclusions on the effect of a mandatory BWCs
policy on officer perceptions of accountability, oversight, and departmental culture remain associative only. One cannot randomly assign different
activation policies within the same department, regulate the behavior of
individual officers differently, and compare these to comparison groups
without expecting violent spill-over effects. These violations make it close
to impossible to validly test discrete policies, as “control officers” are contaminated by having “treatment officers” work side-by-side with them.
Therefore, we are limited to pre-post assessments, such as the present
study and similar approaches employed in this research space.
We cannot completely rule out alternative explanations to these results that took place at or around the time of the BWC policy implementation. Similarly, it is not known—and cannot systemically be uncovered—
whether there was an incident that occurred during the rollout of BWCs
that led to a collective negative experience or perception by these officers.
For example, the TPD management may have used footage to discipline
an officer.107 If the officers as a whole believed the discipline to be unwarranted, excessive, or related to the presence of the BWC, negative ideals
could begin to take hold. In a similar vein, and outside the scope of this
inquiry, if TPD staff unions were vocally opposed to the new policy, it is
likely that they would affect the extent to which officers eventually accepted the BWCs. Finally, it may also be the case that while other agencies
who adopted BWCs experienced improved prosecutions of domestic vio106. See generally U.K. HOME OFFICE, GUIDANCE FOR THE USE OF BODY WORN
DEVICES (2007), http://library.college.police.uk/docs/homeoffice/guidancebody-worn-devices.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Q5J-GR9Z].
107. See, e.g., Cleve Wootson R. Jr., Video Shows an Officer Slamming, Then Pummeling a Black Man Accused of Jaywalking, WASH. POST (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2017/04/12/video-shows-an-officerslamming-then-pummeling-a-black-man-accused-of-jaywalking/?utm_term=.dcb3f0
f82a41 [https://perma.cc/NC26-952J].
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lence incidents,108 evidence collection,109 and reduced complaints,110 the
TPD may have yet to see such positive externalities, or have communicated
these benefits during the course of the study cycle. Arguably, more exposure to the benefits of BWCs could have made a difference in the anticipated direction. Additional research over a longer period of time is
warranted to explore this potentiality.
Finally, it should be noted that the nature of this particular TPD department may limit the direct generalizability of these results. TPD officers are responsible for policing a network of transportation options that
is distant from the jurisdiction of most municipal policing departments.
This divergence extends to the nature and rate of criminal incidents, as
well as the geographic concentration of crimes and offenders. The nature
and environment of the transit system patrolled by this TPD may also have
contributed to the relatively unique findings here. For example, the vast
majority of the transit system—including stations, subway cars and most
busses—are under constant video surveillance. The addition of the core
elements of the BWCs—the digital recordings—may not have been as
stark a divergence from the pre-implementation experience for these officers as for those in departments where dashboard cameras and private
security cameras comprise the extent of their time being recorded at work.
These distinctions—and in particular the latter one—should be explored
more deeply to parse out their influence on these findings.
V. CONCLUSION
BWCs offer law enforcement agencies the opportunity to systematically record officer interactions with the general public. This provides an
opportunity to increase perceptions—both within the law enforcement
community and the general public-regarding accountability and transparency in modern policing. A growing body of literature suggests that
these devices can have a meaningful and positive effect on some law enforcement and public safety outcomes. The relevant sub-literature on officer perceptions of BWCs is similarly encouraging, with some
departments reporting a greater level of interest, acceptance, and utilization of BWCs and the usage policies surrounding them than others. The
majority of these studies have limited their inquiry to common public
safety outcomes and beliefs regarding efficacy and impact of the BWCs. In
this Article, we find that the implementation of a mandatory BWC usage
policy in a large transit police department was associated with significant
and overall negative changes in officer perceptions regarding accountability, oversight, and departmental culture. Based on these results, and
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driven by theories of law enforcement culture and research surrounding
the adoption of new technologies, we suggest that the limited backfiring of
this mandatory BWCs policy observed when compared to the pre-test stage
may be the nature of the policy itself. We hypothesize that the mandatory
nature of the policy limits perceived discretion within the officer population. Additional empirical research is necessary to further parse out these
effects.
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